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INTRODUCTION
The administration of municipal tort liability in Cleveland is
unique. Where other Ohio municipalities administer such liability
by one agency in the municipal government, the City of Cleveland
has two independent agencies: (1) the Law Department of the city,
and (2) the legal division of the Cleveland Transit System, the
municipally owned and operated mass transportation system for
Cleveland and its environs.
The city charter provides:
The director . . . of law . . . shall prosecute or defend
all suits for and in behalf of the city .... '
In the same charter the legal division of the Cleveland Transit
System is authorized to:
. . . prosecute and defend, settle or compromise, all suits for
and on behalf of the city of Cleveland arising out of the
operation of the transit system.2
As the charter provides for separate administrations, it is wise
to consider the two administrative agencies individually.
THE LAW DEPARTMENT
3
Tort liability administered by this municipal agency in Cleve-
lands flows from two Ohio statutes and the common law. The first
statute imposes upon municipalities the duty of keeping public
highways "open, in repair, and free from nuisance,"'' while the sec-
ond establishes liability for injury inflicted by negligent operation
of any vehicles on the public highway by officers, agents or servants
*Assistant Professor, School of Law, Western Reserve University;
formerly Assistant General Counsel, Cleveland Transit System.
The writer desires to express his appreciation to Lee C. Howley, Direc-
tor of Law, City of Cleveland; to Robert J. Shoup, General Counsel, Cleve-
land Transit System; and to their respective staffs for their cooperation
without which this paper could not have been prepared.
'Charter, City of Cleveland §83.
'Charter, City of Cleveland §113-7, in effect January 1, 1943. The
City of Cleveland purchased The Cleveland Railway Co. on April 28,
1942.
'Factual material for this section was obtained by conversations
with city officials, from records and reports of various departments of the
city, and from information furnished by the Municipal Reference Library.
,'OHIo GEN. CODE §3714 (1938).
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of the municipal corporation when engaged in municipal business.5
By common law, municipalities assume tort liability in the field of
proprietary functions but not governmental functions.8
Cleveland has 1,040 miles of paved and 125 miles of unpaved
streets,' as well as 543 commercial vehicles and trucks and 281
passenger automobiles in operation, exclusive of police, fire and
transit system vehicles. The population of 900,000 persons, there-
fore, has contact with these elements from which municipal tort
liability may arise.
Organization
In May, 1946, the Law Department reorganized its tort liability
administration work, creating a Division of Torts and Claims. An
Assistant Director of Law, responsible to the Director, was placed
in charge. The assistant supervises the work of three subordinates8
who investigate accidents, contact injured parties, and negotiate
settlements. Medical, photographic or other technical work re-
quired for investigation is purchased as needed from private sources.
One stenographer is assigned to the-division.
This division receives reports of accidents, accepts claims filed
against the city under the statutes referred to above, and seeks to
settle with the injured parties. Claims which cannot be settled
and which grow into lawsuits then are within the jurisdiction of
the trial counsel, another Assistant Director of Law. This division
aids the trial counsel, however, to prepare for trial by more exten-
sive investigation.
Sometimes petitions are filed in the courts before any claim is
presented. The trial counsel assumes responsibility over such law-
suits immediately and the division has no opportunity to attempt
settlement. The trial counsel handles only lawsuits filed in the
Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County. Some lawsuits of minor
financial significance are filed in the Municipal Court of Cleveland
where jurisdiction is limited to prayers not in excess of $5,000.0
This litigation is handled either by one of the attorneys in the
5 Onio GEN. CODE §3714-1 (1938)). This statute further provides a de-
fense for the municipal corporation if the injury was caused by the opera-
tion of police or fire vehicles carrying out their duties under the theory
that such operation is a governmental function.
6Wester College v. Cleveland, 12 Ohio St. 375 (1861); Tolliver v.
Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E. 2d 357 (1945).
7 In addition to normal wear and tear on the public streets, the city
at present is issuing permits to open the streets to various public and
private utilities at the rate of 1,600 per year. Such man-made defects and
resulting surface breaks after the filling of the holes cause additional
maintenance problems for the prevention of tort liability.
8The Assistant Director of Law and two of his subordinates are
attorneys. The other subordinate is a police officer.
9 OIo GEN. CODE §1579-6 (1937).
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Division of Torts and Claims or by another assistant director of
law assigned to municipal court work.
Type of Accidents
The vast majority of the 1,109 accidents-both personal injury
and property damage-which occurred in 1947 arose out of defects
in the public streets and sidewalks. Almost 90% of the personal
injury and 50% of the property damage incidents resulted from
such defects. Of the remaining accidents-not street and sidewalk
incidents-75% resulted from negligent operation of Department
of Public Service vehicles.'0
Three deaths resulted in 1947 for which the city is alleged to
be liable. One person was killed by a falling tree which struck
his automobile and two persons died after their boat struck a sub-
merged piling in the Cleveland harbor. Death claims are not a
serious problem generally. One catastrophe which occurred Octo-
ber 20, 1944, however, has presented serious death claims. The re-
sult of the East Ohio Gas Company explosion was the total destruc-
tion of several blocks of residences in Cleveland's thickly populated
East Side. One hundred and thirty deaths occurred. Lawsuits and
claims filed allege liability on the city for granting building permits
to construct the gas storage tanks in this type of neighborhood.
Total damages claimed approach $9,000,000. Even though municipal
Iiability upon these facts presents a delicate question of law, the
possibility of settlement negotiations offers considerable work and
thought for the Law Department. Such disaster claims are infre-
Squent, however.
Claims and Settlements
Personal injury claims filed in 1947 totalled 376. Two hundred
and ten were settled and paid. One hundred and forty-seven were
rejected, but the files remain open pending a lawsuit within the
Statute of Limitations period. Fifteen claims were granted the
dignity of moral claims-no legal liability but moral liability on the
city to reimburse the injured party. The Division of Torts and
Claims recommends reimbursement for such claims but has no
power to settle. Payment must be made by appropriate legislation
in the city council for each individual claim.
Of the 357 property damage claims filed in 1947, 126 were paid
and settled. Two hundred and seven were rejected and 23 were
held to be moral claims.
Total claims filed in 1947 were 733 as compared with 585 in
101n 1945, 212 accidents involved service department vehicles. In
1946, this figure increased to 254. These vehicles include garbage and
.rubbish collection trucks, street repair and maintenance equipment.
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1946 and 438 in 1945.11
$11,751.76 was expended to settle the 210 personal injury claims
or an average of $56 per settlement. The property damage claims
averaged slightly over $39 per settlement or $4,925.97 for the 126
paid.
The division was handicapped in its investigative work and
settlement negotiations by the fact that about 25% of the claims
filed were not submitted until at least 6 months or more had passed
since the alleged incident.
It must be noted that 330 reports of accidents which came to
the division in 1947 never appeared as claims. All of these involved
only property damage. No work, other than preliminary analysis,
has been done to investigate or negotiate settlement of these. The
policy is to require the aggrieved party to come forward and pre-
sent his claim.
Litigation
The year 1947 saw 49 tort liability lawsuits filed in the common
pleas court against the city. Only five of these were ones in which
claims had previously been made to the division. Forty-four peti-
tions were filed where no claim was ever filed in the division. Once
again the city was handicapped for lack of opportunity to investi-
gate or to attempt amicable settlement. Sixty-four lawsuits were
disposed of by the trial counsel in 1947-49 settlements before judg-
ment, nine judgments for defendant city and six judgments for
injured plaintiffs. The settlements cost a total of $23,300 for an
average of $475 while the judgments totalled $2,825 for an average
of $471. The total prayers for recovery in all the cases disposed of
equalled $720,271.
In municipal court the division, which has been responsible for
the trial of most cases, has attempted to reduce its backlog. In Jan-
uary, 1947, about 50 cases were pending. In June, 1948, this figdie
had been reduced to 22 pending cases. In 1947, 16 lawsuits were
filed; 12 of these remain in the pending case category today. Two
resulted in judgment for defendant city and two were settled at a
total expenditure of $174.64. Furthermore, in 1947, 12 lawsuits from
previous years were settled at a total amount of $1,326.06 or an
average of $110. No judgments were rendered for plaintiffs. If
the division attorney at the trial considers that the plaintiffs case
be meritorious, settlement is always effected in the court.
"1 The first three months of 1948 brought forth 62 personal injury
and 130 property damage claims. Thirteen of the former and 18 of the
latter were rejected. A total of $790 was paid to settle 11 of the personal
injury claims or an average of $72 per claim; a total of $848 was required
to settle 15 property damage claims or an average of $56 per claim. Also
two property damage claims were recognized as moral claims in this period.
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Appellate work was slight in 1947. In two common pleas court
cases the plaintiffs appealed. Judgments for defendant city were
affirmed. The city appealed no judgments. No cases were appealed
by either side from municipal court decisions.
Expenses
The city council appropriated funds for actual expenditures
of $57,755.38 for judgments, settlements and court costs arising out
of municipal tort liability for last year. In 1946 and 1945, these
sums were $56,694.11 and $50,992.02 respectively. In the 1948 budget
an estimated $50,800 has been set aside to cover these expenses.
The sums include all administrative expenses such as medical ex-
aminations, depositions, and other specialized work except salaries.
Add to this total the sum of approximately $25,000 for salaries al-
locable to the administration, 12 as well as $19,554.80 1. which was the
premium paid for liability insurance 14 to cover the Public Audito-
rium and Municipal Stadium. Total expenditures for tort liability
in Cleveland in 1947, then, approximated $102,000.
Evaluation of Administration
The administration of tort liability in Cleveland by the Law
Department presents the balancing of two conflicting interests.
The public demands the prudent spending of tax money, and
the elimination of accidents arising from defective public highways
and careless operation of city vehicles. Tax funds allocable to tort
liability in 1947 were $102,000 which compared with the total cost
of general operation-$26,557,728-indicates the minor financial role
played by this particular municipal function. Nevertheless, the
function is growing, both in the number of claims filed and average
settlement paid per claim.
Prudent administration suggests adequate investigation and
opportunity to negotiate settlement. Elimination of fraudulent
claims and fair evaluation of proper claims are fundamental if the
highest value is to be obtained for the tax funds expended. The
policy of the Law Department is geared to these goals.
Payment of damages for tort liability by the city has little
effect as a sanction to produce better maintenance of the public
highway or more careful operation of vehicles. As yet the total
12 Several members of the Law Department devote only a portion of
their time to tort liability administration, so an approximation of the
salaries assignable to this work is required. All lawsuits defending police
officers personally for false arrests are also handled by the trial counsel
and investigation work performed by the Division of Torts and Claims. No
city liability is involved, so time devoted to this activity should not be in-
cluded within the municipal administrative expenses.13 In 1946, $8,630.87 and in 1945, $4,552.24 were the premiums paid.
1 See page 455 infra, for criticism of this type of expenditure.
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sum expended is too small in proportion to the entire city operation
expense. More effective results, for example, are probably obtained
by the policy of requiring careless city vehicle operators to pay for
damage inflicted. Each department head has this power to exercise
within his discretion. A well-planned safety program for all city
activities under one agency devoted to promoting safety also ap-
pears wise to reduce the accident incidents. As yet this program
is nonexistent in the governmental and in most proprietary func-
tions of Cleveland.1 5
The second interest confronting the Law Department is the de-
sire of the aggrieved party to receive fair and speedy reimburse-
ment for the damages suffer.ed. The average settlements in 1947-
$56 for personal injury claims and $39 for property damage claims
-appear modest at present standards. The fact that the claimants
accepted them is evidence of some satisfaction. Furthermore, the
fact that only five claims out of 733 filed became lawsuits is addi-
tional proof of satisfaction.16
Disposition of claims is not as speedy as the division desires,
however. A proper schedule would allow an interval of no more
than two weeks between filing and settlement. Today the delay is
at least one month. The increase in number of claims filed and the
attempt to investigate adequately are the causes. The division is
seeking to eliminate delay. It is hoped that success can be readily
attained, for delay in government operation as it affects any in-
dividual citizen is particularly irritating to the American public.1'7
The record system which should compile the important facts
in the city's administration of tort liability is poor. Several months
ago a new system was started which will aid in keeping the Law
Department informed of the precise condition of the city's tort lia-
bility work at any particular time. With the increasing number of
claims, adequate records will be indispensable to denote trends, to
designate the types of unsafe conditions on the highway as well as
careless vehicle operation, to measure the dollar value obtained in
the spending of tax funds. It is hoped that a continual improve-
ment of the record system can be promoted by the Law Department.
THE TRANsrr SYSTEM
The magnitude of tort liability administration arising from the
35 See page 448 infra, for such a program developed by the Transit
System.
26 Three hundred fifty-four claims filed in 1947 were rejected by De-
cember 31, 1947. Obviously, a portion of these will result in lawsuits, too.
Nevertheless, with over one-half the 1947 claims disposed of and only five
lawsuits therefrom, the record indicates reasonable fairness by the division
in . its settlement negotiations.
17 See paje 447 infra,. for a study of the delay in trial and appeal of
lawsuits.
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ownership and operation of the Transit System by the City of
Cleveland can best be appreciated if some general operating figures
are disclosed. In 1947,18 the 1,805 revenue vehicles' 9 of the System
carried 472,662,945 passengers while operating a total distance of
47,968,948 miles over street car, trackless trolley and motor coach
routes totaling 432 miles. The gross revenue was $24,868,714.20.20
Although owned and operated by the municipality of Cleveland,
the Transit System provides urban transportation service not only
within the city proper but also in twenty adjacent suburban com-
munities, of which eight are served in whole or substantially in
whole and twelve are served in part. The geographic area served
is located in the northern half of Cuyahoga County and to a small
extent in the northwest corner of Lake County. This total area
covers approximately 140 square miles and has an estimated present
population of 1,225,000 people.21 Such a vast operation creates many
incidents which give rise to tort liability. The System experienced
17,455 accidents in 1947.22
"$Unless otherwise stated, all 1947 operating figures were obtained
from COMPTROLLER'S WORK SHEETS FOR 1947, prepared by the staff of the
Comptroller, Cleveland Transit System, hereinafter referred to as COMP-
TROLLER'S WORK SHEETS.
19 The 1,805 revenue vehicles were composed of 709 motor coaches,
162 trackless trolleys, and 934 street cars (motor cars and trailers). In
addition, the Sytsem operated 137 nonrevenue or service vehicles which
included 103 maintenance trucks and 34 automobiles for supervisory work.
COMPTROLLER'S WORK SHEETS.
2"REPORT ON PROPERTY AND EARNINGS OF THE CLEVELAND TRANSIT
SYSTEM, March 8, 1948, W. C. Gilman & Co., New York 5, N. Y., hereinafter
referred to as GILMAN REPORT, pp. 54, 60.
Total passengers carried:
1942-408,646,025
1943-470,530,595
1944-479,812,419
1945-480,736,503
1946-493,327,367
Total miles operated:
1942- 39,471,674
1943- 44,890,867
1944- 43,695,367
1945- 42,797,580
1946- 44,882,570
Gross revenue:
1942 (April 29 to December 31 only)--12,950,642
1943-$22,005,775
1944-$23,220,693
1945-$23,432,600
1946-$24,764,647
21 GILMAN REPORT, p. 1.
22 REPORT OF ACCIDENT BUREAU, 1947, Cleveland Transit System; unless
otherwise stated all factual data have been obtained from these annual
reports published from 1942 to 1947, inclusive.
[Vol. 9
TORT LIABILITY.IN CLEVELAND
Organization
The legal division has two sections, both of which are under
the control of the general counsel who is appointed by and is re-
sponsible to the transit board.-
The trial section is composed of four trial counsel, two assigned
to the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County and two assigned
to the Municipal Court of Cleveland. Three legal stenographers aid
in the stenographic work required for trial and appellate work.
The accident bureau, composed of investigating, adjusting,
medical, and clerical sections, is under the direct control of the
superintendent of claims and his assistant, who in turn are respon-
sible to the general counsel
The investigating section operates with seven current investi-
gators whose work is entirely devoted to the investigation of acci-
dents immediately after they occur. One of these investigators re-
mains constantly at the Central Police Station in Cleveland to
obtain police accident reports involving System vehicles, to receive
notices of serious Transit System accidents, and to act as a liaison
officer between the System and the police department. In addition
to the seven permanent investigators assigned to the current acci-
dent branch, three part-time investigators are also employed for
similar work. Thirteen additional employees devote their full time
to the investigation of claims which result in lawsuits. Three are
assigned the added duties of accompanying the trial counsel during
the trial of a lawsuit in order to aid in the preparation and presen-
tation of the Transit System's cases in the courts. Complete prep-
aration for the lawsuits requires the full-time employment of one
photographer and one photographic developer as well as a part-
time engineer who prepares diagrams, maps, profiles, sketches and
mock-ups of the scenes of accidents.
The adjusting section seeks to settle claims. Three outside ad-
justers interview only claimants at their homes or places of business.
Each one of this group has a particular section of Greater Cleveland
as his working territory. The four inside adjusters, who remain in
the Transit System main offices, are in contact with claimants and
their lawyers, if any, endeavoring to settle claims.2 Three of these
inside adjusters devote their full time to personal injury claims, and
Total number of accidents for years prior to 1947, GiLMAN REPORT,
p. 63:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
18,149 17,475 17,238 17,253 16,005
23 Charter, City of Cleveland §113-7.
24 The total number of personal calls per year made at the reception
desk of the adjusting section in the Accident Bureau were as follows:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947
7,988 7,619 7,699 7,982 7,195 7,942
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the fourth concentrates upon property damage claims only.25
The medical section includes three physicians who devote a
portion of their time to Transit System medical work -examining
injured claimants who come to the System's main offices. 26 One
nurse aids the doctors. Additional medical investigation is provided
by dividing Greater Cleveland into twelve geographical districts.
In each district a ph3sician retained by the Transit System, makes
house calls, as directed, to examine persons injured in the operation
of the System.2
The clerical section is responsible for all accident and claim
records. In excess of 450,000 files with essental cross-indices are
handled by the seventeen employees.
Type of Accidents
Of the 17,455 accidents occurring in Transit System operations
for 1947, 12,119 involved street cars, 4,316 involved motor coaches,
and 1,020 involved trackless trolleys. Personal injuries or fatalities
were not suffered in every incident, however. In the street car acci-
dents 3,137 passengers, 197 pedestrians, and 566 other persons28 were
injured, a total of 3,900. Seven fatalities occurred: five pedestrians,
two others. No passenger, incidentally, has ever lost his life in
Transit System operation.29 In motor coach operation 1,305 passen-
gers, 72 pedestrians, and 138 other persons were injured; four pedes-
trians and one other were killed, a total of 1,515 persons injured,
five killed. Trackless trolley operation resulted in injury to 293
passengers, 18 pedestrians, and 28 other persons, or a total of 339
persons injured; no fatalities resulted . 0
25 Since property damage claims do not require this adjuster's full
time, he handles also all workmen's compensation claims made by the
Transit System employees.
26 Medical examinations made by the staff of three doctors with of-
fices in the main office of the Transit System totalled 1,517 in 1947, exclud-
ing medical examinations of employees. In addition, 380 examinations
were made outside of the main office.
27The number of medical calls made by the 12 outside doctors is
unrecorded.
2 Generally, these "other persons" include drivers or guests in private
motor vehicles.
29 This enviable record extends back to include all operations of the
railway system under The Cleveland Railway Company, the privately
owned corporation, before its purchase by the city in 1942.
3o An additional breakdown as to types of accidents designates the
manner in which the accident occurred:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947
Collisions with Pedestrians -------- 281 352 333 330 335 296
Collisions between Street Car-
Motor Coach-Trackless Trolley-- 157 300 363 329 243 292
Collisions with Fixed Objects ---- Not segregated prior to Jan. 1. 1946 112 196
Collisions with Vehicles ---------- 8,794 8,752 8,654 9,099 8,164 8,704
Derailments --------------------- 127 129 128 109 94 126
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Claims
All accidents do not result in claims being made by the ag-
grieved person. In 1947, 7,033 claims were filed, of which 1,456 were
declined.31 The percentage of claims made to accidents reported
was 45.5%:32 The period of time within which claims are filed after
an accident varies from the day of the accident to the last day before
the Statute of Limitations could be invoked on the particular claim
and action. On occasions the Transit System has never been noti-
fied of any claim or accident until the last day of the period for the
Statute of Limitations, when a petition is served upon the System.
The number of accidents unreported by system employees was 1,450,
or about 9.1% of the total number of accidents23 The first and only
knowledge which the System acquires of these incidents is from
the party injured or a disinterested person. Of these unreported
incidents only 349 ended in claims being filed, however.
In general, most claims are filed as soon as the aggrieved party
has determined to a reasonable extent the amount of damage
suffered. In personal injury claims, obviously, the damage suffered
frequently cannot be determined until the injured party has fully
recovered. In these situations the claim is made and negotiations
are postponed until the claimant can present his full facts to the
Transit System adjusters.
Settlement
In 1947, 3,849 claims were settled without suit being filed. Two
hundred and twenty-two claims were settled after judgment had
been rendered against the Transit System. and before appeals were
made. The total amount paid in settlement before a lawsuit origi-
nated was $337,213.23, or an average of $87.61 per claim. Claims
Road and Equipment ------------ 666 461 436 445 692 731
Boarding ------------------- 1,491 1,138 1,071 898 874 1,063
In Vehicles ----------------- 2,154 1,919 1,919 1,839 1,722 1,813
Alighting ------------------- 1,790 1,441 1,296 1,214 1,047 1,029
Doors ---------------------- 529 627 637 573 670 862
Ejectments and Disturbances ------ 230 385 316 336 243 298
Service Equipment ---------------- 49 68 60 96 92 155Miscellaneous ---------------- 1,881 1,903 2,025 1,985 1,717 1,890
2'Number of claims filed and number of claims declined in years
prior to 1947:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Claims Filed --------- 5,920 6,111 6,201 6,022 5,982
Claims Declined ------- 2,106 1,704 1,606 1,448 1,28232 Percentage of claims filed to accidents reported for years prior to
1947:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
34.5% 37.6% 38.89' 38.1% 41.6%
33 Number of unreported accidents for years prior to 1947:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
908 1,146 1,044 1,262 1,166
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settled after suit was filed required the amount of $129,954.53, or an
average of $585.38 per claim. The small group of claims settled
after judgment had been rendered against the Transit System and
before appeal cost the System $12,605.96, or an average of $600.28
per settlement.
In personal injury claims $362,348.06 was paid, or an average
of $164.63 per claim. Property damage claims required the expendi-
ture of $117,425.66, an average of $62.10 per claim. All claims settled
in 1947 totaled 4,092 requiring the expenditure of $479,773.72, or an
average of $117.25. The percentage of claims settled to claims made
was 59.2%.,4
4Analysis of settlements for years prior to 1947:
1942
Settlement of Claims Without Suit
Number of Settlements ---------------------- 2331
Total Amount Paid ----------------------- $132,749.50
Average Amount Paid --------------------- $ 56.95
Settlement of Claims With Suit
Number of Settlements --------------------- 131
Total Amount Paid ---------- $66,588.21
Average Amount Paid --------------------- $ 508.38
Settlement of Claims Judgments
Number of Settlements ---------------------- 35
Total Amount Paid---- ------------------- $ 36,830.85
Average Amount Paid --------------------- $ 1,052.31
Total Number of Settlements -------------------- 2529
Total Amount Paid --------------------------- $236,168.56
Average Paid per Settlement ------------------ $ 100.29
Personal Injury Settlements
Total Number ------------------------------ 1634
Total Amount Paid ----------------------- $220,391.39
Average Amount Paid --------------------- $ 134.87
Property Damage Settlements
Total Number ------------------------------ 895
Total Amount Paid ---------------------- $ 33,234.94
Average Amount Paid --------------------- $ 37.13
Percentage of Claims Settled to Claims Made ---- 42.5%
1943 1944 1945 1946
2877 3249 3315 3253
$190,176.19 $306,262.17 $301,643.04 $271,241.57
$ 66.11 $ 94.26 $ 90.99 $ 83.38
163 241 196 164
$ 47,834.40 $127,908.78 $156,451.55 $138,048.89
$ 293.46 $ 530.74 $ 798.22 $ 841.76
32 15 23 18
$ 11,189.65 $ 7,035.33 $ 27,353.66 $ 55,459.67
$ 349.67 $ 469.02 $ 1,189.29 $ 3,081.09
3093 3590 3634 3615
$249,200.04 $441,206.28 $485,448.25 $464,750.13
$ 85.42 $ 129.83 $ 140.28 $ 136.03
1919 2187 1985 1781
$205,493.07 $375,811.56 $398,973.19 $376,835.65
$ 107.09 $ 171.83 $ 200.99 $ 211.59
1153 1318 1549 1654
$ 43,707.18 $ 65,394.72 $ 86,495.06 $ 87,914.48
$ 37.91 $ 49.61 $ 55.83 $ 53.15
50.4% 57.0% 59.7% 58.6%
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Settlement negotiations vary in length of time, depending upon
the seriousness of the injury and the extent of the claim. After the
meritorious nature of a claim has been determined settlement ad-
justing will be pursued up to a certain point. If the claimant de-
mands an excessive amount of money, in the opinion of the Transit
System, it is to the benefit of the System and the car-riding public,
who owns the System, to deny such claim and meet the claimant in
the trial court. Frequently, before trial, a claimant faced with the
uncertainty of a jury verdict will temper his prior claim, and
settlement can be effected in that manner. Generally, immediately
before trial, claimants reduce the amount requested to a figure more
in line with an acceptable adjustment.
Litigation
The percentage of lawsuits filed against the System to claims
made was 4.2% in 1947.35
In the Municipal Court of Cleveland, the System tried 38 cases
in 1947. In 27, judgments were rendered for defendant System,
while in 10 plaintiff obtained judgment. One suit ended in dis-
agreement; in one suit a new trial was granted the defendant
System; one suit was appealed by the city and two suits were dis-
missed by the plaintiff. Total amount of judgments rendered
equalled $2,452.41. In these 10 judgments rendered for the plain-
tiffs, total amount claimed in the petitions was $8,482.53. In all
38 cases tried, plaintiffs prayed for a total of $39,619.83.
On January 1, 1947, 216 lawsuits were pending, while at the
end of the year 207 were pending. puring the year 127 lawsuits
were filed and 136 disposed of. The total amount claimed by plain-
tiffs in lawsuits pending on December 31, 1947, was $360,253.14.30
5 Percentage of lawsuits filed to claims made for years prior to 1947:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
4.8% 4.9% 6.0% 6.1% 5.0%
C" Analysis of litigation in Municipal Court of Cleveland for years
prior to 1947:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Number Suits Tried ---------- 89 62 52 56 34
Judgments for Plaintiffs ------- 20 23 16 15 7
Judgments for Defendant System 69 39 36 41 28
New Trial for Defendant
System -------------------- 2 1 5 2 3
New Trials for Plaintiffs ------- 1 0 0 1 0
Judgments Appealed by Defend-
ant System -------------- 4 1 1 2 3
Judgments Appealed by Plain-
tiffs ----------------------- 2 1 0 1 1
Suits Dismissed ------------- 46 60 36 14 13
Lawsuits pending January 1 .... 273 257 212 197 215
Lawsuits filed in year ---------- 171 163 197 187 133
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Activity in 1947 in the Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga
County was greater and more expensive. Thirty-seven lawsuits
were tried. Plaintiffs obtained judgments in 20, totalling $141,243.
In these, plaintiffs had prayed for money damages totalling $324,-
543. Defendant System obtained judgments in 17 lawsuits. A new
trial was granted to the city in three cases; the plaintiff appealed
four cases; 15 lawsuits were dismissed. The total amount claimed
by all plaintiffs who tried lawsuits in this court in 1947 amounted
to $589,543.
Lawsuits pending at the first of the year numbered 357, while
at the end of the year this figure had increased to 361. One hundred
and seventy-six were filed during the year against the System and
172 lawsuits were disposed of. At the end of 1947 the total amount
prayed for in damages in lawsuits pending in the common pleas
court amounted to $5,273,360.19.11
Lawsuits disposed of in year---
Lawsuits pending December 31-
1942 1943
Total Amount
Judgments
Rendered __$ 7,909.08
Total Amount
of Prayers
by Plaintiffs
Obtaining
Judgments _$ 30,034.27
Total Amount
of Prayers
in Lawsuits
Pending De-
cember 31 -- $586,456.64
208
212
1944
212
197
1945
169 132
215 216
1946
$ 10,756.62 $ 7,502.00 $ 4,503.66 $ 4,896.1a
$ 97,236.60 $ 23,024.74 $ 9,456.74 $ 10,096.18
$380,025.94 $264,775.55 $290,622.11 $352,608.40
37 Analysis of litigation in Common Pleas Court of Cuyahoga County
for years prior to 1947:
Number Suits Tried ------------
Judgments for Plaintiffs --------
Judgments for Defendant System
New Trials for Defendant
System------------------
New Trials for Plaintiffs -------
Judgments Appealed by Defend-
ant System--------------
Judgments Appealed by Plain-
tiffs--------------------
Suits Dismissed--------------
Lawsuits pending January 1___
Lawsuits filed in year
Lawsuits disposed of in year._
Lawsuits Pending December 31-
1943
25
11
14
1944
22
6
16
1946
30
16
14
2 2 0 3
1 2 0 0
3 0 0 2
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Appellate practice in 1947 was limited. One judgment appealed
by the System was reversed by the court of appeals - a $10,000
judgment. Four judgments were pending in this court. These in-
volved verdicts totalling $23,400.18
Briefly 75 lawsuits were tried in 1947. Five hundred and sixty-
eight lawsuits were pending in all courts at the end of the year.
An aggregate sum of $5,633,613.33 was demanded in all these pending
cases.39
Expenses
Administrative expenses in 1947 amounted to $286,730.63.40 The
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Total Amount
Judgments
Rendered $ 18,850.00 $ 11,850.00 $ 5,250.00 $ 117,070.00 $ 71,448.33
Total Amount
of Prayers
by Plaintiffs
Obtaining
Judg-
ments $ 149,500.00 $ 96,985.50 $ 68,000.00 $ 275,293.00 $ 420,631.33
Total Amount
of Prayers
in Lawsuits
Pending
Dec. 31 $2,066,504.21 $2,265,142.23 $3,462,342.27 $4,201,832.60 $4,859,176.0838 Analysis of appellate court litigation for years prior to 1947:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Court of Appeals
Appealed by Defendant-
System
Judgments Affirmed ---------- 6 1 0 0 0
Judgments Reversed ---------- 3 0 2 3 0
Appealed by Plaintiffs
Judgments Affirmed ---------- 6 3 0 1 1
Judgments Reversed --------- 4 0 0 0 0
The Supreme Court of Ohio has never granted an appeal as of right
to Transit System tort litigation. All cases are presented either by the
Transit System or plaintiffs in a request for an order to certify the record.
The Supreme Court has been most reluctant to grant such requests in
common tort liability cases. As a practical matter appellate litigation for
the Transit System is concluded in the court of appeals.
39 General litigation summary for years prior to 1947:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Lawsuits tried ---------------- 123 87 74 79 65
Lawsuits pending December 31 441 414 439 515 573
Total Amount
Demanded in
Lawsuits
Pending $2,652,960.85 $2,645,168.17 $3,727,117.82 $4,492,454.71 $5,211,784.48
40 Administrative expenses for years prior to 1947:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
$207,322.35 $223,739.20 $232,539.76 $246,318.54 $258,317.24
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greater bulk of this amount was allocated to salaries - $220,817.11.
The amount paid to dispose of all claims and judgments
amounted to $517,052.65. Total expenses allocated to tort liability,
arising out of the operation of the Transit System, therefore, were
$803,783.28. The percentage of this total expenditure to the gross
receipts in 1947 was 3.3%.41
Evaluation of Administration
The Transit System, in administering tort liability, is also con-
fronted with conflicting interests. Obligations to the injured party,
the car riders, and the general public demand a balance. The in-
jured party is seeking speedy and fair compensation. The car riders
are seeking (a) better service which can be acquired to some ex-
tent by maintaining at a minimum the amount expended for tort
liability and utilizing any savings in this expenditure for better
transportation service, and (b) safe transportation. The general
public seeks the elimination of accidents from the streets of Greater
Cleveland.
The injured party's idea of fair compensation most frequently is
not commensurate with the System's idea of the same. The System
is governed by the over-all ratio of total tort liability expenditures
to gross receipts. Individual cases mean nothing, except insofar as
they may influence this ratio. To each injured party, however, his
case is paramount. He is the one suffering and expending money as
a result of the accident. His mind is further influenced by the fact
that the party who allegedly caused his injury is a large financial
operation. It is not execution-proof. A balance between the de-
mands of the injured party and the consideration of fair compensa-
tion as viewed by the Transit System generally occurs. As the
figures indicate, only between four and five percent of the claims
filed result in lawsuits. The element of speedy compensation is
also important to the injured party. The Transit System seeks to
settle cases in which it is liable and the injury slight within 24
hours. Where liability is present and the injury serious, additional
time is granted until the aggrieved party regains health and then
settlement negotiations proceed. Where there is a question of liabil-
ity, the System endeavors to determine from its own investigations
within ten days whether or not it will approve a claim. In the
majority of cases, this time schedule prevails.
If the claimant is unsatisfied with the settlement offer and files
41 Total tort liability expenses for years prior to 1947:
1942 1943 1944 1945 1946
Amount paid $460,948.68 $487,945.10 $698,624.60 $756,118.55 $750,071.70
Percentage to
gross receipts 2.47% 2.24% 3.06% 3.3% 3.1%
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a lawsuit, the present docket in Cuyahoga County requires him to
wait approximately eighteen months between the date of filing the
petition and trial. In the Municipal Court of Cleveland, this time
lag at present is approximately twelve months. The period which
an appeal must wait to be heard in the Court of Appeals for Cuya-
hoga County is now about six months. The delay from the date of
the court of appeals decision until the supreme court rules on the
motion to certify the record is at present about two months. Law-
suits, therefore, do not give speedy justice; two years' time or more
may elapse before final disposition. If a new trial be granted addi-
tional months of delay occur. This element, however, is controlled
by the courts, not the municipality. It must be remembered, the
figures indicate that lawsuits do render greater compensation on
the average than settlements. The expense required and the time
consumed, as well as the physical and nervous tension of a lawsuit,
may well reduce the economic gain resulting from the higher com-
pensation acquired, however.
The car riders have an indirect interest in maintaining the low-
est possible expenditures for tort liability. Whatever is not ex-
pended in this category may well be devoted toward improvement
in the mass transportation service. There are no stockholders de-
manding dividends, for the property is owned and operated by the
City of Cleveland. There is no profit in the business sense of the
term. Whatever profit results is reflected by improvement in serv-
ice. This financial interest of the mass of car riders however is not
great. The ratio of tort expenditures to gross receipts has remained
steady at about three to four percent. Any money saved in and of
itself would represent only a slight value to the car riders in im-
proved service.
More important, the car riders seek safe transportation. In
so far as tort expenditures exert pressure on the System and its em-
ployees to strive for safer operation, a greater direct benefit accrues
to the passengers in general.
To the extent that the expenditures for tort liability create a
pressure upon the Transit System to reduce accidents, the general
public will be benefited. The 17,455 accidents in 1947 in and of
themselves present a large figure. Analyzed, however, into number
of accidents per one million passengers carried, the safety record
appears brighter. In 1947 this figure was 37 accidents. One accident
incident occurred every 2748 miles traveled by Transit System
vehicles. An impressive record when one considers that each inci-
dent, however minor, is included in this calculation.
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More tangible results in accident prevention have appeared
from the well-developed safety program carried on by the Transit
System. This program involves safety lectures, motion pictures,
contests between operating stations, and constant safety advertis-
ing.42 The fact that the Transit System is the most frequent and
constant user of Cleveland's streets and the fact that Cleveland was
awarded the title of "Safest Large City" in the nation for 1947
permit the System to be proud of its share in this safety honor.
At present there is being developed a program for tabulating
complete information concerning each individual accident. Some of
the interesting elements which will be revealed for each accident
will be the time of day, type of vehicle, type of accident, the age,
sex, race, experience of the employee involved, and other pertinent
information. It is hoped from this that each year an analysis of all
accidents will reveal the weak points in the continuous battle to
improve Transit System safety. In addition, a program is being de-
veloped to further increase the contact between the employee in-
volved in an accident and the Accident Bureau in order to impress
upon the employee individually what his accident has cost the
System in dollars and cents as well as damage to the injured party.
This is not planned as a basis necessarily for reprimanding or pun-
ishing the employee. Reprimands and punishments in the form of
days off or firings are given at present. Such discipline will always
be required. The System does not, however, extract any money
reimbursement from employees whose negligent actions require
money expenditure by the System.
More effective accident prevention may be obtained, it is be-
lieved, by bringing the employee into closer contact with the human
elements of injury and monetary losses which have resulted from
his accident.
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON SUGGESTED REFORMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF TORT LIABILITY
Notice of Claim or Injury
In a majority of the states the injured party must file with the
municipality within a maximum period of time a notice of the
incident which resulted in damage to him. This requirement is
42 For example a safety suggestion campaign brought forth, in 1947,
976 suggestions from employees on methods for improving safety. Sixty
nine and two-tenths per cent of these were accepted and adopted; 9.8%
were rejected; 20.9% were pending at the end of the year.
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established by statute,4 municipal charter,44  or municipal
ordinance. 45
Theoretically, since municipalities are immune from tort lia-
bility,4 6 any statute, charter or ordinance which imposes liability
can provide a reasonable condition precedent before the city can be
sued.4' Just as there exists no common law right to sue the mu-
43 ALA. CODE ANN. it. 37 §476 (6 months) tit. 37 §504 (1940) (content
of statement of claim or injury); CoLo. STAT. AN. c. 163 §261 (1935) (90
days); CONN. GEN. STAT. §1420 (1930) (60 days but if injury caused by ice
or snow, 10 days); DEL. Ruv. CODE §2470 (1935) (City of Wilmington, six
months); GA. CODE ANN. §308 (1935) (no time limit, notice just prerequisite
to lawsuit); IDAHo CODE AxN. §49-162 (1932) (30 days); ILL. ANN. STAT. c.
24 §1-11 (1942) (six months); IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns Supp.) §48-8001
(1947) (60 days, but if injury caused by ice or snow, 30 days); IowA CODE
§420-25 (30 days, cities'under special charters) §614.1 (1946) (60 days,
municipal corporations); Ky. REv. STAT. §411.110 (1946) (90 days); MASS.
ANN. LAws c. 84 §18 (1946) (30 days, but if injury caused by ice or snow,
10 days); MIcm STAT. ArN'. (Henderson 1936) §1291 (60 days, villages),
§1806 (60 days, 4th class cities), §598 (60 days, cities); miNN. STAT. ANN.
(Mason 1929) §1831 (30 days); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§6577, 6823, 7044, 7524,
7636 (1939) (90 days except for first class cities which require 60 days and
second class cities which require 30 days); MoNT. REv. CODES Amx. §5080
(1935) (60 days); NES. REV. STAT. §14-801 (1943) (10 days, metropolitan
cities); N. H. REV. LAws c. 105 §9 (1943) (10 days, towns); N. Y. GEN.
Mum. LAw §50-e (60 days); N. D. REy. CODE §40-4201 (1943) (30 days); PA.
STAT. ANx. tit. 53 §2774 (1947) (six months); R. I. GEN. LAws c. 352 §7
(1938) (60 days); S. D. CODE §45.1409 (1939) (60 days); TENN. CODE ANN.
§8596 (Williams 1934) (90 days); UTAH CODE ANN. §7-76 (1943) (30 days);
VT. PuB. LAWS §4958 (1933) (20 days); VA. CODE ANN. §6043a (1942) (60
days); WAsim. REV. STAT. ANN. §9481 (1933) (30 days, 2d, 3d, and 4th class
cities); Wis. STAT. §81.15 (1943) (30 days).
44 Sandstoe v. Atchison, T. and S.F. Ry., 28 Cal. App. 2d 215, 82 P. 2d
216 (1938); Nelson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 113, 122 P. 2d
252 (1942); Harrington v. Battle Creek, 288 Mich. 152, 284 N.W. 680 (1939);
Peterson v. City of Red Wing, 101 Minn. 62, 111 N.W. 840 (1907); Sprague v.
City of Astoria, 100 Ore. 298, 195 Pac. 789 (1921); Connolly v. Spokane, 70
Wash. 160, 126 Pac. 407 (1912).
45Wichita Falls v. Geyer, 170 S.W. 2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943)
(home-rule city); City of Terrell v. Howard, 130 Tex. 459, 111 S.W.
2d 692 (1938) (hone-rule city); Hase v. Seattle, 51 Wash. 174, 98 Pac. 370
(1908) (ordinance passed under provisions of state statute).4
.6 See David, Municipal Liability in Tort in California, 6 So. CALIF. L.
Ray. 269 (1933); Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation,
54 HARv. L. Ra. 437 (1941); Warp, The Law and Administration of Munici-
pal Tort Liability, 28 VA. L. Rav. 360 (1942).
47 Grambs v. Birmingham, 202 Ala. 490, 80 So. 874 (1919); Gribben v.
City of Franklin, 175 Ind. 500, 94 N.E. 757 (1911). See David, Municipal
Liability in Tort in California, 7 So. CALIF. L. Ray. 372, 402 (1934).
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nicipal government there is also no right in the city to demand the
filing of notice without express legislative action. 8
Ohio has as yet never adopted a notice statute. 9 In the past
two decades, however, three attempts to enact such a law were
made. None succeeded; one bill died in the House Judiciary Com-
mittee,5 0 two bills were enacted in the general assembly by over-
whelming majorities only to be vetoed by the Governor. 51
One Ohio city attempted to provide for the filing of notice by
charter provision. East Cleveland passed a charter amendment
which established as a condition precedent to a lawsuit against the
city the filing of notice of the incident within 30 days after it hap-
pened. The tort liability and the notice requirement were both
limited to injuries arising out of the failure of the city to maintain
the public highway in good repair. When plaintiff Wilson sued the
City of East Cleveland he failed to allege in his petition that he had
filed this required notice. The city demurred. The common pleas
court and the court of appeals sustained the demurrer. The supreme
court, however, reversed judgment and overruled the demurrer. -5 2
The court reasoned that the municipality was without power to
prescribe a condition precedent to its liability imposed by the
general law. Since the state had prescribed liability and had not
provided for the filing of any notice, the East Cleveland charter
provision, to that extent, conflicted with the general law and was
void.
. Russell v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 5 Harr. 193, 162 Atl.
71 (Del. 1932); Green v. Town of Spencer, 67 Iowa 410, 25 N.W. 681 (1885).
'9 In City of Warren v. Davis, 43 Ohio St. 447, 3 N.E. 301 (1885), the
supreme court held that the statute which permits damages to be assessed
against a municipality when injury results from improvements in public
buildings, places, streets and bridges, provided a claim has been filed before
the lawsuit was instituted, was inapplicable to require a plaintiff, injured
by a fall in a hole in the street, to file a claim notice before filing his
petition.
5 House Bill No. 313, 94th General Assembly, provided for a 60-day
period in which the injured party must file a notice of injury with the
municipality, setting forth the time, place, and cause of injury; otherwise
the city could not be held liable. Bulletin Ohio General Assembly No. 94
(1941-42).
51 House Bill No. 230, 88th General Assembly, provided for a 120-day
period in which the injured party must file notice of injury. In the House,
88 legislators approved this bill while only 20 rejected it; in the Senate, 22
senators unanimously adopted the bill. Bulletin Ohio General Assembly
No. 88 (1929-30).
Senate Bill No. 178, 92nd General Assembly, provided for a 30-day
period in which a notice of injury must be filed. It was passed in the
Senate, 27 to 1, and in the House, 94 to 3. Bulletin Ohio General Assembly
No. 92 (1937-38).62 Wilson v. East Cleveland, 121 Ohio St. 253, 167 N.E. 892 (1929).
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Oklahoma has followed a similar rule.5 3 Also in Florida where
a city charter provision similar to East Cleveland's amendment was
construed as the basis for the cause of action and not merely as a
remedial requirement, such a charter provision was held unconstitu-
tional.5 4 If, on the other hand, a state statute demands the filing of
notice can a municipality by charter set forth its own independent
notice procedure? Minnesota and Wisconsin have permitted this
action.55
What purposes will the filing of a notice satisfy? The courts
have recited many: to permit the municipalities to investigate the
accident, 8 to allow examination of the injuries received,57 to de-
termine the condition of the alleged defect which caused the acci-
dent,58 to prevent fraudulent claims,5 9 to prepare for trial,5 to settle
53 Tulsa v. Macura, 186 Okla. 674, 100 P. 2d 269 (1940); Tulsa v. Adams,
151 Okla. 165, 3 P. 2d 155 (1931); Tulsa v. McIntosh, 141 Okla. 220, 284 Pac.
875 (1930). Although the Ohio Supreme Court has been confronted with
only one municipal-charter attempt to require the filing of a notice of claim
or injury, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has been plagued with similar
cases. The court observed in Tulsa v. Macura, supra at 676, 100 P. 2d at 271:
"Like Banquo's ghost, or the proverbial cat of many lives, this Charter pro-
vision, in one form or another, returns to this court for observation."
54 Skinner v. City of Eustis, 147 Fla. 22, 2 So. 2d 116 (1941). Cf. Wilkes
v. City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal. App. 2d 393, 112 P. 2d 759
(1941).
55 Peterson v. City of Red Wing, 101 Minn. 62, 111 N.W. 840 (1907);
Harris v. Fond du Lac, 104 Wis. 44, 80 N.W. 66 (1899); accord, Pender v.
Salisbury, 160 N.C. 363, 76 S.E. 228 (1912); Ellis v. Geneva, 259 App. Div.
502, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 21 (1940); Walters v. Tacoma, 88 Wash. 394, 153 Pac. 311
(1915); Wolpers v. Spokane, 66 Wash. 633, 120 Pac. 113 (1912).
But in an earlier Minnesota case it was held that the passage of a
state statute on notice repealed a similar charter provision. Nicol v. St. Paul,
80 Minn. 415, 83 N.W. 375 (1900).
56 Smith v. Birmingham, 243 Ala. 124, 9 So. 2d 299 (1942); Nelson v.
City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 113, 122 P. 2d 252 (1942); Christian
v. Waterbury, 123 Conn. 152, 193 Atl. 602 (1937); Tredwell v. Waterloo, 218
Iowa 243, 251 N.W. 37 (1933); Spangler's Adm'r v. Middlesboro, 301 Ky. 237,
191 S.W. 2d 414 (1945); Bethscheider v. Hebron, 137 Neb. 909, 291 N.W. 684
(1940); Bowers v. South Glen Falls, 260 App. Div. 39, 23 N.Y.S. 2d 656
(1940); Gannon v. Fitzpatrick, 58 R.I. 147, 191 Atl. 489 (1937); Gidcome v.
Nashville, 177 Tenn. 295, 145 S.W. 2d 1029 (1941).
5 7 Spangler's Adm'r v. Middlesboro, 301 Ky 237, 191 S.W. 2d 414 (1945);
Pierce v. Spokane, 59 Wash. 615, 110 Pac. 537 (1910).
58 Nelson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 113, 122 P. 2d 252
(1942); Galloway v. Winchester, 299 Ky. 87, 184 S.W. 2d 890 (1944); Pierce
v. Spokane, 59 Wash. 615, 110 Pac. 537 (1910).
59 Murphy v. Chicago, 318 Ill. App. 227, 47 N.E. 2d 494 (1943); Gidcome
v. Nashville, 177 Tenn. 295, 145 S.W. 2d 1029 (1941); Titus v. City of Monte-
sano, 106 Wash. 608, 181 Pac. 43 (1919); Giuricevic v. Tacoma, 57 Wash. 329,
106 Pac. 908 (1910).
60 Gidcome v. Nashville, 177 Tenn. 295, 145 S.W. 2d 1029 (1941); Pierce
v. Spokane, 59 Wash. 615, 110 Pac. 537 (1910); Hase v. Seattle, 51 Wash.
174, 98 Pac. 370 (1908).
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claims,61 to consult witnesses,"2 to obtain witnesses,6 3 to procure
evidence,6 and to limit the claimant to recovery only on the defect
named in his notice.6 5
Most states with all or some of these reasons in mind have
drafted their notice statutes to require the written statement of the
injury to include the time and place of the accident, how it hap-
pened, and what injuries were received. 6 The first such enactment
was passed by Massachusetts in 1877. The majority adopted since
that date have usually provided for this notice procedure only when
injuries arise. out of the failure or neglect of the city to maintain
the public roadway and its environs in proper repair. These statutes
have passed not only the test of general adoption in our country but
also the test of time. Ohio municipal corporations, barred from in-
dependent action by the Wilson v. East Cleveland rule, have the
right to expect from the state government - both the general as-
sembly and the Governor - the passage of a well-considered notice
statute. The Law Department of the City of Cleveland and the
legal division of the Transit System strongly favor state legislation
requiring the filing of notice as a condition precedent to any lawsuit
for tort liability against the City of Cleveland.
What elements should a notice statute contain?
1. The filing of written notice should apply to all tort claims
against the municipality.
It is true that the majority of states' statutes restrict the notice
requirement to accidents from defects in the public highway and its
environs 7  Obviously in large cities where the public streets are
many and the area of possible tort incidents wide the city officials
have little opportunity to acquire knowledge of the accident. 68 But
more than the desire to obtain information is involved. Municipali-
ties are not operating for profit. Public funds are involved. Oppor-
61 Wilkes v. City and County of San Francisco, 44 Cal. App. 2d 393,
112 P. 2d 759 (1941); Sandstoe v. Atchison, T. and S.F. Ry., 28 Cal. App.
2d 215, 82 P. 2d 216 (1938); Nagle v. City of Billings, 80 Mont. 278, 260 Pac.
717 (1927); Gannon v. Fitzpatrick, 58 R.I. 147, 191 Atl. 489 (1937); Pierce
v. Spokane, 59 Wash. 615, 110 Pac. 537 (1910).
62 Nagle v. City of Billings, 80 Mont. 278, 260 Pac. 717 (1927).
63 Palmer v. Cedar Rapids, 165 Iowa 595, 146 N.W. 827 (1914); Titus v
City of Montesano, 106 Wash. 608, 181 Pac. 43 (1919).
64 Titus v. City of Montesano, 106 Wash. 608, 181 Pac. 43 (1919).
65 Harrington v. Battle Creek, 288 Mich. 152, 284 N.W. 680 (1939).
6 8Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia.
67 See note 43 supra, for states so providing.
68 See David, Municipal Liability in. Tort in California, 6 So. CALiF. L
REv. 372, 402-03 (1934).
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tunity for fair settlement, discovery of fraudulent claims, and
proper preparation to defend the public interest weigh heavily in all
municipal tort situations. These interests demand the filing of
notice by the aggrieved party to permit intelligent handling of the
claim and lawsuit.
The statute should not permit any distinction in the notice re-
quirement between governmental and proprietary functions of local
government as one court has allowed.60  New York by statuteT0 and
at least one court by decision7 have attempted to eliminate this
difference. The same public interests must be protected whether
the function be governmental or proprietary.
2. The filing of the written notice must be a condition prece-
dent to the filing of a lawsuit and the petition must aver such
filing.
Notice is jurisdictional and creates the right of action.72 The
injury creates the cause of action. 2 Some courts have denied the
municipality the power to waive the notice requirement; 7' other
courts apply the stricter rule which holds that the claimant must
plead the filing of his notice to recover in any lawsuit.7 5 The ma-
jority of decisions support this latter rule.76 It would not appear
too burdensome to require the injured person to plead the filing of
notice in his petition once the duty to file is established. The danger
of damage to the public interest which would result from unwar-
ranted waiving of the required notice because of political pressure
or expediency will be greatly minimized.
3. The written notice must identify the injured party, the time,
place, manner and extent of the injury, and the notice shall be held
satisfactory if substantial facts are stated which can enable the city
officers to determine with reasonable effort the tort incident to
which the notice refers.
60 Harms v. City of Beatrice, 142 Neb. 219, 5 N.W. 2d 287 (1942).
70 N.Y. GEN. MUNICIPAL LAW Art. 4, §50e.
71 Collins v. Memphis, 16 F. Supp. 204 (W.D. Tenn. 1936).
72 Sprague v. City of Astoria, 100 Ore. 298, 195 Pac. 789 (1921).
7 2Mercer v. Richmond, 152 Va. 736, 148 S.E. 803 (1929). Contra:
Marino v. East Haven, 120 Conn. 577, 182 Atl. 225 (1935).
7 4 Hall v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 198, 120 P. 2d 13 (1941); King v.
Boston, 300 Mass. 377, 15 N.E. 2d 191 (1938). Contra: Cole v. Seattle, 63
Wash. 1, 116 Pac. 257 (1911).
75 Swenson v. Aurora, 196 III. App. 83 (1915); Harms v. City of
Beatrice, 142 Neb. 219, 5 N.W. 2d 287 (1942). But in Koontz v. St. Louis, 230
Mo. App. 128, 89 S.W. 2d 586 (1936) where plaintiff did not plead his filing
of notice and defendant failed to state this defense, the court held the notice
requirement waived.
706 Thomas v. Coffeyville, 145 Kan. 588, 66 P. 2d 600 (1937); Harrington
v. Battle Creek, 288 Mich. 152, 284 N.W. 680 (1939); Gidcome v. Nashville,
177 Tenn. 295, 145 S.W. 2d 1029 (1941); Hamilton v. Salt Lake City, 99
Utah 362, 106 P. 2d 1028 (1940).
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When called upon to interpret notice statutes, the courts usually
have applied a strict rule as to the filing, but a liberal rule is en-
forced when determining whether sufficient facts have been in-
cluded in the statement.77 Substantial compliance with the ele-
ments demanded in the statute is satisfactory.7 8 If the notice states
(a) a place which is nonexistent,7 9 (b) a place which is considerable
distance from the actual place of the occurrence,8 0 (c) the manner
of injury as a fall on ice and snow when it was actually a hole in
the highway,8 ' the courts have held such notices to be invalid and
recovery by lawsuit barred. Then, too, if the notice fails to state
correctly the time of the incident 2 or to describe only generally the
injuries received,83 it is ineffective and precludes recovery. If, how-
ever, the claimant raises the dollar amount of damage claimed in his
petition over what he submitted in his notice, such should not pre-
vent his recovery, and one court has so held.84
What the notice must contain to be valid should be measured
by the purposes to be achieved. Essential facts- the person in-
jured, time, place, manner and extent of injury - are basic. To de-
fine by statute the precise terms of each is dangerous, for all the
possible situations cannot and will not be considered by the law-
makers. Judicial interpretation will share in this control. Let the
legislature and courts be governed by the needs and desires of the
cities: opportunity to investigate, to negotiate a fair and speedy
settlement, to prevent fraudulent claims, and to prepare for a
possible lawsuit.
Ohio municipalities, especially the large population centers as
Cleveland, have the right to continue their demands on the general
assembly and chief executive for the adoption of a notice of injury
and claim statute as well as the enlightened interpretation thereof
by the courts of Ohio.
77Volk v. Michigan City, 109 Ind. App. 70, 32 N.E. 2d 724 (1941);
Koontz v. St. Louis, 230 Mo. App. 128, 89 S.W. 2d 586 (1936).
78 Smith v. Birmingham, 243 Ala. 124, 9 So. 2d 299 (1942); Christian
v. Waterbury, 123 Conn. 152, 193 Atl. 602 (1937); Atlanta v. Hawkins, 45
Ga. App. 847, 166 S.E. 262 (1932); Gannon v. Fitzpatrick, 58 R.I. 147, 191
Atl. 489 (1937).
79 Van Den Bergh v. City of New York, 208 App. Div. 72, 203 N.Y.S.
127 (1924) (notice stated place of injury as "524 West 85th St.", but actually
the accident occurred at 525 West End Ave.).
80 Tredwell v. Waterloo, 218 Iowa 243, 251 N.W. 37 (1933) (3000 feet
away).81Morrisey v. Boston, 268 Mass. 324, 167 N.E. 651 (1929); Lane v.
Cray, 50 R.I. 486, 149 Atl. 593 (1930).
82 Swenson v. Aurora, 196 Ill. App. 83 (1915).
83 Marino v. East Haven, 120 Conn. 577, 182 Atl. 225 (1935).
84 Smith v. Tacoma, 163 Wash. 626, 1 P. 2d 870 (1931) (notice claimed
damages of $7500, petition prayed for damages of $15,000).
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Insurance
To the average citizen-taxpayer it is a mystery why the munici-
pal government does not purchase tort liability insurance from
private companies. Where studies have been made of such insurance,
however, it has been determined more prudent for the municipality
to act as a self-insurer.8 5 Two such studies have been made in
Cleveland on the Transit System property. Formerly the System
insured its nonrevenue service vehicles with private insurance. A
study revealed better value could be obtained by assuming tort
liability on the self-insurer basis for such vehicles, as the revenue
vehicles were handled, so the insurance was cancelled. Several
years ago one large accident insurance company made a three
months' inveqtigation of the Transit System property only to report
that the premium for one year's insurance would far exceed the
actual sum utilized by the System for one year's liability
expenditures."8
Today the city government purchases private liability insurance
to cover all accidents arising out of operation of the Public Audito-
rium and Municipal Stadium. As proprietary functions from which
revenue is received, these properties impose tort liability on the
municipality-8 7 In 1947, 111 claims were presented.88 The premium
paid has increased fourfold in 1947 over the 1945 payment, however,
without a corresponding increase in claims. With premium costs
increasing so rapidly, the time has come for the municipal govern-
ment to reassess the value received from this private insurance.
One student of municipal government has stated that generally
private insurance for municipal tort liability is "nothing short of a
luxury."89 In these days of financial strain on the municipal budget
in Cleveland, the local government can ill afford luxuries.
Limitation of Recovery to Actual Damages
Two thoughtful legal articles on the subejct of tort liability for
85 Warp, The Law and Administration of Municipal Tort Liability, 28
VA. L. REv. 360 (1942).
80 The possibility of buying catastrophe insurance to cover any verdicts
in excess of a certain sum, $25,000 for example, also has proved uneconom-
ical upon study. The absence of serious accident potentials such as steep
hills, dangerous bridges, etc., further minimized the need for catastrophe
insurance.
87See page 436 supra.
88 Thirty-four additional claims were made. These accidents happened
when the Auditorium or Stadium was leased to a private organization which
had assumed tort liability and protected itself by private insurance inde-
pendently of the city insurance. Would it be wise to require all lessees
to assume tort liability for their particular events saving the city harmless
from any claims filed?
89 Warp, The Law and Administration of Municipal Tort Liability, 28
VA. L. REv. 360, 384 (1942).
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municipalities suggest the limiting of the amount of recovery to the
actual damages incurred by the injured party."' Such limitation
will protect the public purse from skyrocketing damage verdicts,
will eliminate unpredictable and emotionalized juries, will grant
damages more in proportion to real losses, and will tend to speed
settlements. A state statute providing for such limitation would be
necessary.
When confronted with this suggestion, both the Law Depart-
ment and the Transit System were skeptical. The former feared
an increase in the number of claims filed; the latter desired a free
hand in negotiating settlements unfettered by any relatively fixed
amounts based on damages actually suffered."" Where liability is in
issue, it is feared that claimants would be reluctant to negotiate
settlement because of their belief that actual damages should be
paid regardless of the question of fault.
Despite the fears expressed, tort liability administration by the
municipality is not measured by the same interests as private corpo-
ration liability. The public money expended and the satisfaction
of the citizens injured may well compel the limitation of damages
recovered to actual losses incurred. At least a comprehensive in-
vestigation of this proposal as it affects the City of Cleveland would
be a wise step.
CONCLUSION
Municipal administration of tort liability in Cleveland- both
by the Law Department and the Transit System-in 1948 will in-
volve approximately $1,000,000, 18,000 accidents, and 8,000 claims.
In short, this administration has become a "big business" in itself.
Constant study and improvement of the administrative function
is required in order to satisfy aggrieved parties with fair and speedy
justice, to protect public funds, and to reduce the number of public
accidents. To the extent that city officials promote such study and
improvement of this process, all citizens will benefit.
90 David, Municipal Liability in Tort in California, 6 So. CADw. L. REV.
372, 467 (1934); Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation,
54 HARv. L. REV. 437, 461 (1941).
91 This attitude may be caused by the fact that the Transit System over
its years of experience does not consider itself the victim of many excessive
verdicts.
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